Introduction
Mexico’s recognition of sexual rights has been inconsistent. On the one hand, the mobilization for the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people has historically been centered in Mexico City, and has enjoyed avant-garde progress throughout Latin America in the formalization of such visible rights as equal marriage, homoparental adoption, or gender identity (De la Dehesa 2015; Diez 2011; Salinas 2017; Sources 2015). On the other hand, subnational-level realities are highly heterogeneous in terms of the recognition of these same rights. There are states such as Nuevo León, Querétaro, and Aguascalientes, where the influence of church hierarchies is deeply rooted and there is very little recognition of rights; and others such as Coahuila, Campeche, Colima, Quintana Roo and Durango, where the formalization of rights has advanced very broadly. Others still, include states like Michoacán, where the influence of the Catholic Church is very strong, but the mobilization for rights has progressed significantly in legal matters; and states like Veracruz, with the lowest national indicators of people’s religious identification, but where there are still large gaps in the recognition of LGBT rights (López 2017). This state-level disparity adds to a long list of pending issues, such as the implementation of protocols to provide services to the LGBT population in the areas of education, health, security and justice, in addition to a dramatic increase in hate crimes based on sexual orientation and gender identity throughout the country (Observatorio Nacional de Crímenes de Odio contra las Personas LGBT 2020; Brito 2018).
The challenges and resistance to the expansion of LGBT rights in Mexico and their different advances at subnational level reflect that “every part of the country has experienced the process of building a differentiated secular state” (Hernández 2019, 189). Given the centralization of the agenda and that the structure of the Mexican federal model grants the states autonomy to legislate in these matters, collective actors defending LGBT rights have been forced to dynamize their demands at subnational level, putting forward strategies that combine strategic litigation, legislative lobbying, protests, and public claims, obtaining different results (Salinas 2017; López 2017). However, this same dynamic of state autonomy in the area of LGBT rights has meant that conservative groups and veto-wielding actors have intensified their actions and mobilizations at subnational level to block the advancement of these rights. The hierarchies of the Catholic Church and various evangelical churches and political parties that oppose women’s and LGBT human rights have promoted collective actions articulated under the discourse of opposition to what they call “gender ideology,” following the logic of expansion of this type of reactions that have occurred in broad sectors of Western societies (López 2018; Bárcenas 2018; Careaga 2016). The actions of conservative groups and organizations with clear religious sources have existed in Mexico throughout modern history, and during the second half of the 20th century they established political alliances with semi-clandestine and partisan organizations (Torre 2020). However, the 21st century, has so far seen growing coordination of several of these actors to promote an open activism that rejects sexual and reproductive rights.
Two of the most visible facts of the articulation of conservative groups in Mexico in the 21st century were presented as reactions to the institutional advancement of sexual and reproductive rights. First, in 2007, after the decriminalization of abortion in Mexico City, the then President of the Republic together with the President of the National Human Rights Commission unsuccessfully challenged the constitutionality of the reform. At the same time, civil organizations calling themselves “pro-life” increased throughout the country and a wave of constitutional counter-reforms emerged in eighteen state congresses to “protect life from conception,” intended to prevent women from exercising their right to decide about their own bodies. On the other hand, in 2016, after the Executive’s reform proposal to homologate rights such as egalitarian marriage and homoparental adoption at the federal level (following the criteria established by the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation [SCJN]), many of these groups reacted strongly and coordinated via the creation of the National Front for the Family (Frente Nacional por la Familia, FNF). However, the reform was stopped thanks to the growing articulation of civil and religious organizations present in several Mexican states, combined with intense street, legislative, and media activism (López 2018; Bárcenas 2018). These episodes of reaction and coordination reflected the resistance to the advancement of sexual and reproductive rights consolidated in Mexico City to the other states of the republic. Paradoxically, and despite the persistence of resistance and mobilization led by conservative actors in the states, these processes have not been broadly studied at subnational level.
We must therefore understand the dynamics of the relationship between mobilization and counter-mobilization within the field of sexual politics disputes in Mexico at subnational level. While the academic literature has so far focused on studying the characteristics of conservative activist action (Morán 2018; Vaggione 2020; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017), its implications in terms of the regulation of morality and sexuality (Sáez and Morán 2016), the religious and secular dimension of their actions (Lemaitre 2013; Ruibal 2014; Vaggione 2005), as well as the causes that help to understand their emergence (Biroli and Caminotti 2020; Corrales 2020), it is important to analyze the movement-countermovement dynamics in a relational way and to inquire about the implications of conservative mobilization on the type of opportunities, repertoires, and strategies of LGBT movements (Dorf and Tarrow 2014). In this respect, we must ask ourselves what type of mobilization-countermobilization dynamics are present at subnational level in Mexico besides the institutional and political effects pointed out in the literature. What effects does the action of counter-movements have on LGBT mobilization in subnational environments adverse to demands that challenge hetero-patriarchal and heteronormative principles?
To answer these questions, in this article, I analyze the case of Veracruz, a state with poor recognition of sexual rights and with a visible presence of both pro- and anti-sexual rights activists and organizations. Following an analytical model that approaches movement-countermovement dynamics relationally, I argue that in the face of the impacts of activism by conservative groups and organizations in the state, two mechanisms of movement response emerge: learning and adaptation of repertoires. These responses, which modify strategies and practices, reveal a process that goes from the subnational to the national level, given the high veto capacity of conservative activism to limit reforms and changes in the area of LGBT rights in the state.
Conservative activism and impacts on mobilization: theoretical and methodological precisions
One of the most important socio-political phenomena of the last decade in Latin America has been the growing conflict generated around the demands for the recognition of sexual and reproductive rights. Given the historic advances made by feminist and LGBT movements in the different states and at regional level in Mexico, the public presence of conservative groups and organizations, calling themselves defenders of the natural family, of life, of the rights of parents and children, among others has intensified (Morán 2018; Biroli and Caminotti 2020). The actors that mobilize to oppose sexual and reproductive rights are diverse, but basically include Catholic Church hierarchies and Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal evangelical churches, civil society organizations that present themselves as defenders of traditional moral values, political actors with strong ties to conservative churches and groups. These actors have been described in detail by Vaggione (2020), who highlights conservative Catholic activism and its uses of strategic secularism, as well as the revival of evangelical and neo-Pentecostal organizations and groups that lead the opposition to rights through creating moral panic and electoral alliances (Corrales 2020).
The main framework that unites conservative collective actors in their activism in opposition to sexual politics is the rejection of what they call gender ideology and the questioning of the advancement of rights by defining them as part of a “cultural imposition and colonization” (Miskolci and Campana 2017; Kuhar and Paternotte 2017). Although conservative groups have always mobilized against sexual and reproductive freedom policies, since the mid-1990s, and with greater intensity since the second decade of the 21st century, they have joined forces to promote agendas, platforms, and coordinated collectives regionally to position their actions under three argumentative strategies. First, to oppose what they call “unnatural tendencies” that are disseminated in educational programs and legislative projects, and would go against the natural difference between men and women. Second, to put forward scientific ideas and arguments that oppose what for them is an anti-scientific current represented by the constructivism of feminist theories. Third, to defend “natural law” against what they conceive as a “cultural and ideological revolution,” overlaying what they consider to be the natural rights of the family, freedom of thought, conscience, and religion (Vaggione 2020, 257).
In this respect, the growing manifestation of these groups and organizations should be understood as a counter-mobilization (Tarrow 2004, 132), in that they have moved from historical resistance to greater organization, coordination, and articulation of collective strategies in response and reaction to the advancement and recognition of sexual and reproductive rights at state and international levels. In all cases, the counter-mobilization is generated as resistance to gender equality policies and those that oppose discrimination based on sexual orientation; it defends principles of the heteropatriarchal and heteronormative order that regulate bodies and sexuality, and that give greater privilege to white men while subordinating women and people who do not reproduce heterosexual practices (Sáez and Morán 2016; Morán 2018).
Early theories of social movements and collective action pointed to the joint constitution of the dynamics of mobilization and countermobilization, which engender sustained interaction that produces mutual influence between opposing collectives (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996; Tarrow 2004), understood “in a dialectical relationship and thus in some sense the actors who initiate any particular cycle of contention may be understood as the ‘movement,’ while those who respond may be cast in the role of ‘countermovement’” (Dorf and Tarrow 2014, 451). Within the field of mobilization and countermobilization for LGBT rights, there is a relationship of interaction and mutual determination that encompasses the discursive frames driven by actors (Benford and Hunt 2003), the influence of variables such as national-international discursive opportunities (Ayoub and Chetaille 2020) or how the expansion of a countermovement can be shaped into a political opportunity for the movement (Dorf and Tarrow 2014).
These dimensions, which emphasize discursive and political opportunity factors, are synthesized by Stone (2016), who identifies three logics of the counter-mobilization of conservative activism that lead to institutional impacts: a) the instrumental reaction characterized by conservative groups’ strategic use of the discourse of “moral politics,” with which they incorporate, as part of their electoral political agenda, the denunciation of the changes that feminist and LGBT movements want to promote and impose “electoral costs” on those who support such changes; b) the reactive reaction, which is differentiated by the promotion of concrete political initiatives to roll back advances in LGBT rights, such as support for referendums or legislative initiatives; c) a proactive opposition that distinguishes itself precisely by promoting policies or laws against the rights of sexual diversity, aimed at protecting what they call “the rights of the family, of children or religious freedom,” and therefore, interfering with the principles of the secular State (Stone 2016; Green 2000). Although these three types of reactions tend to overlap, their analytical specificity lies in the understanding that the instrumental reaction refers to the intentional strategies of using discourses such as gender ideology to attract the population’s support and put political pressure on governments or legislatures. Reactive or proactive reactions, which usually base their legitimacy on instrumental reactions, are distinguished by the type of institutional orientation: in the first case, they seek to reverse reforms that have already been approved; in the second, they promote reforms that block possible future recognition of rights.
In addition to the institutional rights-blocking repercussions of the instrumental, reactive, and proactive logics of conservative activism, a relational perspective on the movement-countermovement interaction requires an analysis of the type of unplanned impact that the countermovement response has on the movements’ repertoires and strategies. Theories of collective action have made it clear that mobilization repertoires and skills respond to the capacity to implement resources and ideas relationally in a field of interaction between groups with unequal distribution of power and capacity for action. Thus, the movement-countermovement interaction will always have unplanned effects on the logics and experiences of collective action, which delineate and determine the decisions and strategies followed by collective actors in their interaction.
Methodology
Following this logic, I study the case of Veracruz for descriptive and analytical purposes (Gerring 2006). This is an intentional selection (Giménez 2012) because it is a case in which there is low formal recognition of LGBT rights and a visible presence of both LGBT collective action and conservative activism that opposes their rights. In this respect, Veracruz constitutes a typical case of the blockage of sexual rights at subnational level, where a poor recognition of rights persists, reflecting the continuity of legal frameworks that reproduce traditional values and norms. Although there tends to be an interpretation that emphasizes a kind of liberal culture in Veracruz regarding non-hegemonic sexual practices, within the field of sexual policies it is one of the most backward states in the country as it has not yet recognized rights such as equal marriage, gender identity, or homoparental adoption. At the same time, according to the National Observatory of Hate Crimes against LGBT People (2020, 20), in Mexico, Veracruz registers the highest number of such crimes, with a total of 49 between 2014 and May 2020. This is reinforced by a serious historical context of subnational authoritarianism, growing violence, and high levels of impunity (Olvera 2018).
The analysis covers the 2016-2020 period. It begins with the formal establishment of the main contemporary actors of the conservative countermovement in the country and the state (FNF and Más Vida Más Familia in 2016) and extends to the failed attempt at legislative approval of same-sex marriage in 2020. To analytically reconstruct the impacts of countermobilization on mobilization, I follow a process of decomposition strategy (Tilly 2001). By doing so, I identify the main mechanisms of the movement’s response to conservative activism in the state, understanding mechanisms as a delimited class of events that alter the relationships between sets of specific elements, in identical or very similar ways, in a variety of situations (Tilly 2001).
The empirical material is made up of local press monitoring, official statements of actors and fifteen in-depth interviews with leaders of the main LGBT collectives in Veracruz. The selection of the interviews was based on three criteria: a) leaders of collectives and associations visible in the state; b) coverage of the different cities in the state; c) at least five years of experience in the movement that allows us to assess changes and continuities in their repertoires and strategies (see table 1).1
The interviews were conducted with the leaders of the main organizations of the LGBT movement, whose testimonies provide insight into the dilemmas, decisions, and experiences that emerge in response to the actions taken by conservative activism. The interviews involved representatives of organizations and collectives from Xalapa, Veracruz, Orizaba, Cordoba, Coatzacoalcos, and Poza Rica, in order to provide a non-centralized reconstruction of the process that would reflect the state’s local particularities. The triangulation of the information consisted in contrasting the reconstruction of the processes of interaction between the movement and the countermovement in the analyzed period with the experiences of the activists, in order to identify the response mechanisms that were repeated on an ongoing basis.
Veracruz: actors of mobilization and counter-mobilization
Veracruz is the third most populated state in Mexico (with 8,113,000 inhabitants) and has a marked subregional division of six intermediate cities (metropolitan areas) with 300,000 and 500,000 inhabitants each: Poza Rica, Orizaba, Cordoba, Xalapa, Vera Cruz, and Coatzacoalcos. This sub-regional division responds to a historical socio-territorial configuration with highly diverse social, cultural, political, and economic processes, which is why the sub-regional specificities present Veracruz as a state where social mobilization and protest acquire particular territorial features (Aguilar, Moreno and González 2020; Olvera, Zavaleta and Andrade 2012). In relation with the mobilization of the rights of the LBGT population and the sociocultural environment in which this occurs, Barffusón (2016) explains that the subregions of Xalapa and the port of Veracruz have tended to be more open, among other reasons, because they are the state’s main cultural and university centers. On the other hand, a strong entrenchment of patriarchal and macho practices — explained as part of the “oil culture”— persists in Poza Rica and Coatzacoalcos-Minatitlán, and is marked by the preponderance of the oil extractive economy (Macedonio 2016). Meanwhile, with the weight of industry and local business in the area, the subregions of Córdoba and Orizaba are characterized by the historical presence and influence of the Catholic Church and by the strong roots of the conservative National Action Party, among others (Olvera 2018).
In this respect, as I present below, the main conservative organizations that oppose LGBT rights have considerable weight in the regions of Poza Rica, Córdoba-Orizaba and Coatzacoalcos-Minatitlán. However, although it is a highly geographically diverse state, the process of conservative activism follows a clear state logic insofar as resistance is staged in Xalapa and Veracruz, which are the seats of the state’s political powers.
The actors of the mobilization
In a context of the invisibility of dissident sexual practices, the first organizations that began to promote sexual rights in the state emerged in the 1990s. Associations such as Xochiquetzal, in Xalapa, or Nuevo Lenguaje Siglo XXI, in the port of Veracruz (De la Dehesa 2015, 309), and, later, Fundación Hacia un Sentido de la Vida (2004), were the first to work with an approach centered on education and awareness-raising on issues related to HIV and sex education (Barffusón 2016, 163). A central element in Rafael de la Dehesa’s in-depth investigation is that the Veracruz context seemed to be characterized by an “implicit pact” where the persecution of sexual practices increased with the electoral alternations that took place at municipal level, especially in municipalities such as Veracruz, Boca del Río, Cardel, and Córdoba. There, the rise of the National Action Party (PAN) and “a more competitive electoral arena disturbed tacit agreements with state authorities” (De la Dehesa 2015, 312).
Faced with increased persecution and stigmatization, various actors linked to the fight against HIV and for LGBT rights organized spaces such as the Luna Forum, from where they initiated petitions and negotiations with authorities (De la Dehesa 2015, 312-315). The continuity of this stigmatization is associated, then, with the growth of the formalization of the demands for LGBT rights in Veracruz and with the incorporation of such visible repertoires as the first pride marches in Xalapa and Cordoba (in 2007); the formation of different local committees for the organization of these events; and the birth of associations such as Orgullo Xalapa and Orgullo Veracruz, focusing on the visibility and awareness of diversity issues.
Subsequently, in the second decade of the 21st century, there was a significant increase in the creation of associations and organizations focusing on defending LGBT rights in Veracruz. On the one hand, pride marches were held in more municipalities, including annual marches in cities such as Veracruz (2011), Coatzacoalcos (2010), Orizaba (2015), Poza Rica (2015), and Alvarado (2016).2 On the other hand, multiple collectives were created throughout the state, demonstrating a clear collective decision to articulate themselves through associations that would identify and organize their demands. These associations include Colectivo Ambient Tales de Diversidad Sexual, in Coatzacoalcos in 2012; Movimiento DiversoSexual de Córdoba; Centro de Desarrollo Social y Humano: Contigo México and Almas Cautivas, in Xalapa in 2013; Colectivo Igualdad de Orizaba, in 2014; Soy Humano in Veracruz, Colectivo LGBTTTI de San Andrés Tuxtla; Alianza Colibrí de Orizaba; Manos Rosas de Martínez de la Torre, Gayub de Alvarado, in 2015; or EcoSex de Xalapa, in 2017. This growing group also includes the Asociación Comunidad Jarochos Alianza para la Inclusión y la Indiscriminación (2014), located in the port of Veracruz, which leads litigation strategies through legal appeals that have allowed several same-sex couples to marry in the state.
The statewide growth of collectives is also associated with the process experienced nationally as part of the LGBT movement and the consolidation of the human rights agenda, especially the dissemination of the principles of denunciation against discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity (Diez 2011; De la Dehesa 2015). The work of most collectives and associations focuses on education, community support, and socialization (with the public and institutions) around issues of diversity and sexual rights.
The actors of the countermovement
For the anti-sexual rights conservative camp, it is important to note that Veracruz is one of the most religiously diverse states in Mexico.3 Despite this, the presence of the Catholic Church is a deep-rooted, and it plays a leading role in the state’s social and political dynamics. Taking up the guidelines established globally by the Catholic hierarchy, the Catholic Church in Veracruz has a clear position against sexual and reproductive rights, and spreads messages of opposition from its homilies, through the positions of the official spokesperson of the Archdiocese of Xalapa as well as through the media, in which it is very influential. Likewise, and although less publicly known, the state is also home to a broad group of Pentecostal and Neo-Pentecostal evangelical churches that coincide in the belief that politics should be determined by God’s principle (Vázquez 2007).
Among the political actors that have been historically opposed to sexual and reproductive rights are the PAN; the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI); and, after its recent creation, the evangelical Social Encounter Party (whose state leader comes from a history of militancy within the PRI and the PAN in Coatzacoalcos). There are also clear divisions among the state representatives of the governing Morena party, with several of its members opposing such rights (E9).
The FNF stands out among the civil associations representing conservative activism. It was formed with different state nodes in Xalapa, Veracruz, Cordoba, and Coatzacoalcos since its national-level public appearance in 2016. Despite presenting itself as an independent civil association, its links with the hierarchs of the Catholic Church in the state are close and explicit, and it reproduces its messages and symbols in different demonstrations and public presentations.4 Another organization with close ties to the Catholic Church is the Consejo Veracruzano Más Vida Más Familia association (previously called Vida Familia), led by Arturo Segovia from Coatzacoalcos, which, in 2016, successfully promoted the reform to the Civil Code that defined the protection of life beginning at conception. Besides acting within the state, these organizations are part of national and international networks of conservative groups that defend views related to the natural family and life from conception. In particular, the Consejo Veracruzano Más Vida Más Familia is part of the board of directors of the Sumas Coalition, a network of more than seven hundred organizations in Mexico that was articulated in November 2018 to, in their words, counter attacks on the family, life, and freedoms.
The rise of conservative activism and the responses of LGBT mobilization (2016-2020)
Given the increasing formalization of resistance from conservative groups against sexual and reproductive rights, the first alternation of state government took place with the arrival of the PAN led by Miguel Angel Yunes (2016-2018). As revealed by Rafael de la Dehesa (2015), the PAN’s arrival in different municipal mayors’ offices in Veracruz since the early 2000s represented a public escalation of the persecution and stigmatization of the LGBT population supported by the government. Subsequently, in 2018, the new Morena party came to state power under the leadership of Cuitláhuac García, who, despite representing a new government option that self-identifies as leftist, has not provided support to promote the reforms for the recognition of rights demanded by the LGBT population.
The following is an analytical breakdown of the interaction between movement and countermovement in the 2016-2020 period, based on the response mechanisms that demonstrate a growing process of linking the local to the national, given the high veto power that conservative groups in Veracruz have maintained.
Learning and adapting repertoires for coordination and liaison with national stakeholders
In February 2017, the Yunes administration modified the marriage charter of the State Civil Code and, as a product of an error in the drafting of the reform, the new version of the Civil Code did not specify that marriage was the union between a man and a woman. Although this modification was the result of a mistake by the PAN and not its intention to recognize same-sex marriage, this episode gave rise to an unintended opportunity for both conservative groups and the LGBT movement.
On the one hand, faced with this situation, the Catholic Church and civil organizations such as Vida Familia and the recently created FNF protested and, in less than a week, the governor withdrew the modification arguing that it had been an error and that the majority of Veracruz did not support such agendas. As a result, the conservative groups at the head of the newly created organizations (FNF and Vida Familia) gained public visibility by circulating their denunciations against the possibility of threatening the “natural family.” On the other hand, this episode of reaction and the immediate governmental response triggered the articulation of LGBT collectives throughout the state. This had never happened before, because, in the words of one of the most visible activists: “we were very upset that the government backed down, especially because of the pressure from right-wing groups and churches. That’s when we started to organize ourselves and began to hold meetings” (E2). In response to the government’s refusal, various activists, collectivesm and LGBT rights defenders held meetings in Orizaba, Xalapa, and Veracruz on March 11, 14, and 16, to call for the formation of the Veracruz LGBTTTI+ State Coalition (La Coalición), made up of 35 associations and collectives from different municipalities on March 22, 2017.
One of the main arguments presented for the constitution of the Coalition was the need to respond to the increasingly visible conservative reaction in the state, especially since the appearance of the FNF, which they accused in its press conferences of disseminating hate speech and disinformation (E3, E4). As we mentioned, given the great heterogeneity of sub-regional realities in Veracruz, this was the first time that a coordinated collective action was configured throughout the state: requesting an audience with the governor to demand that the LGBT population be respected. As a result of this request, the associations signed a coordination agreement based on a common agenda: the promotion of same-sex marriage, gender identity law, criminalization of hate crimes, protocol for trans persons in schools, public policies, labor promotion, and access to work and health care without discrimination (E1, E4, E11). Besides visibility, the founding of the State Coalition served to create dialogue tables to promote institutional public policies, as, in the words of the movement’s representatives, “it was very easy for the governments to say they were inclusive by allowing marches, graffiti, hanging a banner, but they didn’t want us to be at the dialogue and work tables with government institutions” (E4). The Coalition is currently made up of more than sixty collectives from all over the state and, in addition to direct advocacy work with legislators, has incorporated as part of its repertoire the organization of press conferences to make their demands and points of view visible in relation to specific situations, and hearings and activities with public bodies (E2, E4, E14).5
In the face of the increasing circulation of the discourses and actions of conservative associations, the LGBT movement in Veracruz experienced a reflective process of learning and adaptation of its repertoires that affected its practices and strategies. These responses make it clear that the learning and adaptation of repertoires should have been geared towards greater coordination and increased capacity to link with national actors and agencies, given the closure experienced at state level. Thus, one of the first actions of the Coalition was to file petitions with the National Council for the Prevention of Discrimination (Conapred) requesting action to be taken, for which the body issued a recommendation (the first of its kind in Mexico) urging the Executive and the State Legislature to modify the Civil Code to combat discrimination against the LGBT population (Aguirre and Chiñas 2017).
Following this juncture, in December 2017, the Veracruz Más Vida Más Familia Council presented an initiative backed by 12,000 signatures, many of them collected in the southern part of the state, with which it sought to modify the Constitution through a reform that included “elevating the family and marriage to constitutional rank, as referents in the design of public policies that reinforce it; establishing that parents influence their children’s education” (Congress of the State of Veracruz 2017), following the Catholic standards’ own definitions of family and natural marriage. Despite having passed in a first round of voting, and in the face of the criticism received by different international organizations, the reform was not approved and the conservative collective formally broke off relations with the PAN. This break between the civil organization and the political party made it clear that the religious associations’ main interest was to include the anti-rights agenda as defining the party’s identity, which is related to their sustained efforts, supported by the Catholic Church, to create their own parties (Castillo 2019). Considering this situation, conservative activism pursued a logic of street-electoral activism in the 2018 elections that promoted the idea of a “punishment vote” for those who supported sexual and reproductive rights (López 2018).
In the midst of growing collective demands, and with an unprecedented level of coordination, the LGBT mobilization found support in legislative factions such as those of the Partido de la Revolución Democrática (Party of the Democratic Revolution, PRD) to promote two reforms to Articles 196 and 144 of the Criminal Code of the State of Veracruz between 2017 and 2018. The reforms criminalized hate crimes based on sexual orientation and gender identity (E2, E3, E11). The initiative sought to guarantee punishment for those responsible and to train ministerial and police agents on issues of investigation and dealing with LGBT people (“Preparan iniciativa para tipificar” 2017; Meléndez 2018). Hate crime motivated by prejudice against sexual orientation and gender identity is characterized by a high level of viciousness and cruelty, whose victims are mainly gay men or transgender women, who are considered the biggest transgressors of heteronormative parameters (Domínguez-Ruvalcaba 2015, 8). The organizations denounced, among other things, that the increase in hate crimes was associated with the public positions of conservative religious groups, especially after the emergence of the FNF and the failed reform experience during the Yunes administration.6 Despite having been presented by local deputies as vanguard reforms in Mexico, they were not harmonized with public policies either in the courts or in the public ministries (E4). As a result, a high rate of impunity remains and it is difficult for the prosecutors’ offices to initiate investigations under this specific criminal type.7
As part of the learning and adaptation of repertoires, the challenge imposed by the context of increased violence forced the movement to improve its strategies of internal articulation and national connections to promote the documentation and information gathering for denunciations. By doing so, the Coalition established links with the Mexican LGBTTTI+ Coalition (made up of more than two hundred collectives nationwide) and the Observatorio Nacional de Crímenes de Odio (led by the Ciudad de México by the Arcoíris Foundation) and has generated information that has allowed the movement to follow up more clearly on the reality of hate crimes in the state: “this organizational communication has helped us to follow up on what we are doing, so that the information is clear. Because one of the first things we found in the work tables with the government and the Legislative was precisely that, they told us: ‘You people can’t agree on anything’” (E4).
Although the majority of activists point out that the LGBT movement in the state does not plan its actions to respond to the FNF or the Church (E1, E4, E7, E11, E14), they recognize the need experienced by all groups to adapt their communication and message dissemination strategies. From the standpoint of the LGBT movement, the main resources available to civil groups opposed to their rights are the economic capital that allows them to mobilize throughout the state and the closeness and support of the Catholic Church (E4, E6, E2, E8, E9). The movement identifies that this is an institution that is not only socially legitimate but also politically legitimate (E2, E7). According to the activists, since the formation of the FNF, messages aimed at attacking the LGBT population are disseminated in masses to reach believers and as a resource to “threaten” politicians. In the respect, there was a communication and advocacy challenge, because, from their perspective: “it is true that everyone is scared, no one wants to be spoken ill of in mass, who is going to distrust the priest, who is going to question the priest’s word?” (E9).
Similarly, while the repertoire of information production and documentation focused on the problem of hate crimes, the vast majority of activism focusing on education and denunciation underwent a process of reflection on the need to generate strategies to prevent and reduce the visibility of their individual figures, as well as adequacy and collective self-care in the face of the dangers (E1, E2, E3, E5, E13). As one of the most visible leaders of the movement (a trans woman) recalls, after receiving multiple attacks from people who self-identified as religious or who accused her of spreading gender ideology in schools: “I should have been more cautious, and I should have been more and acted more collectively. Seeking greater collective visibility. The idea was to go to meetings in government offices or elsewhere, always in groups so as not to expose ourselves. We have modified things in the way we move, because we don’t know what these people are capable of” (E2).
The movement learned to adapt its repertoires to the challenges and influence of conservative activism in the state. These responses were characterized by a gradual effort of greater coordination among actors at state level, and self-care and strategic linkage with actors nationally to render visible the institutional resistance to the demands to respect LGBT rights.
Learning and adapting to legislative change roadblocks: the need for national legal work
The main effects of the growing conservative activism against sexual rights at subnational level in Mexico have been reflected in institutional blockages. Despite the fact that every year the LGBT movement tries to promote legislative reforms for the recognition of their rights in Veracruz, these have been limited due to the conservative veto. In this respect, since December 2019 and until June 2020, an intense political and media discussion was presented in Veracruz around the proposal to reform the state’s Civil Code promoted by Congresswoman Monica Robles of the ruling Morena party. The reform included more than fifty substantial modifications to women’s rights, including divorce without cause, freedom in the order of surnames of sons and daughters, recognition of work in the family, compensatory pension, as well as the recognition of same-sex marriages. As part of an agreement between the deputy proponent and the state government, several forums for Equality and Non-Discrimination were held in different municipalities, in order to socialize and discuss the content of the reform. Despite the urgency and need for this proposal within the constitutional framework and international human rights law, it generated fierce and bitter resistance from conservative groups and organizations that argued that it sought to impose gender ideology, “abortion” and “the destruction of the family.” In a process that escalated in aggression, the conservative groups protested in the discussion forums held in Poza Rica, Cosamaloapan, Acayucan, Orizaba, Coatzacoalcos, and Xalapa, and even forced the cancellation of one of these meetings in the port of Veracruz.
The most confrontational episodes occurred in Orizaba (January 18) and Coatza-Coalcos (January 20), two of the municipalities most influenced by the Catholic Church and with the greatest presence of conservative groups (E3, E9, E10, E11, E13). For the forum in the city of Orizaba, through Más Vida Más Familia and Comunidad, Familia y Cultura, the organizations called to take over the facilities to prevent, in their words, the advance of the attack against the values of the family in Veracruz (Molina 2020b; Figueiras 2020). According to the accounts of those who participated in this meeting, the groups that mobilized to protest against the reform were basically the same throughout the state, and in the case of Orizaba, they were directly led by priests of the Catholic Church and Christian representatives (E3, E9, E11). Catholic and Christian groups interrupted the Forum in Coatzacoalcos with protests; for the deputy who convened the Forum, these protests were coordinated by the same people in all the municipalities (Chiñas 2020).
The last of the forums was held at the State Congress in Xalapa on January 23, 2020, with the participation of the Federal Undersecretary of Human Rights, Population and Migration, Alejandro Encinas, who spoke in favor of the reform, stating that the changes were fully in line with international human rights standards (“Reforma al Código Civil” 2020). Finally, with 35 votes in favor and 14 against, the Reforms to the Civil Code of the State of Veracruz were approved on May 28, 2020, representing great progress in terms of rights and protections for women in the state. However, as a consequence of the conservative groups’ protests, the amendment recognizing same-sex marriage was not approved within the reform; only one amendment was made allowing the recognition of cohabitation between same-sex couples and, in the final opinion of the Congress, it was stated that the commission did not contemplate amending the marriage reform, “to settle this discussion and not to contribute to further confrontations” (Ruiz 2020).
Despite the fact that the legislative advance of equal marriage was blocked, the recognition of cohabitation was interpreted by opposition groups as “a legislative trap to allow same-sex marriage in Veracruz without prior discussion” (“Aprueban reforma al Código Civil” 2020). For its part, in the Sunday communiqué of May 31, the official spokesperson of the Archdiocese of Xalapa accused the deputies of “dynamiting” marriage and the family, pointing out that the reform, which had taken into account the majority opinion, would open the way for the SCJN to “impose” same-sex marriage in the state (Hernández 2020).
These episodes, which could be described as a defeat for LGBT mobilization in the state in the face of the success of conservative activism in blocking same-sex marriage, had, however, unintended effects on mobilization. These were characterized, on the one hand, by a learning in legislative negotiation processes, and on the other, by an adaptation of repertoires that go from the political at subnational level to the legal at national level. The testimony of an activist with a trajectory as a local deputy is clear:
I think that the Civil Code has been a turning point and I have seen that since then there has started to be movement again, because although I believe that the government is more attentive and listens more, we have to go out anyway, we have to do what we have to do, they are taking away equal marriage, so we put together a legal strategy to see if we can push to force them. Because there is a panorama where if we organize ourselves well, we could achieve results. (E9)
In terms of learning effects, the conflictive rejection of same-sex marriage led the LGBTTTI+ State Coalition to rethink its practices and strategies when planning legislative advocacy and negotiation: “The strategy we have chosen now is one of non-visible dialogue before the media, with other people; we are no longer just talking as we used to. It is not that we are making pacts in the dark, but the initiatives we have now, because of the experience of what happened to us with the integral reform to the Civil Code, those anti-rights groups simply blew them all up” (E4).
In the face of the continued capacity of conservative vetoes to stop institutional reforms for the recognition of rights, the LGBT movement’s response mechanism of learning and adaptation of its repertoires reflects a need to redirect strategies from legislative negotiation at subnational level to national level political and legal pressure. The experience of the forums forced the LGBT movement to redirect demands and accept the approval of concubinage in order to, based on this, promote strategic litigation based on the filing of amparo actions to challenge the reform. The main argument is that, by modifying the definition of concubinage, the Legislature failed to also modify the definition of marriage and, according to SCJN criteria, the reform should be declared unconstitutional (Molina 2020a):
We have adapted, based on what happened with the Civil Code, which got stuck only in the cohabitation part; what we have done is to organize ourselves in a state strategy to request unconstitutionality to the State and National Human Rights Commission, and the second strategy is that we are massively filing amparos for affected and legitimate couples, trying to appeal to the Supreme Court once again. (E6)
The first collective objective achieved after these strategic redefinitions was presented on August 3, 2020, when the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH 2020) filed an action of unconstitutionality against the Civil Code of the State of Veracruz “for violation of the right to non-discrimination, by preventing same-sex marriage in that state,” which is still being processed before the SCJN.
Conclusions
In this article, I have analyzed the impacts of conservative activism on the mobilization for LGBT rights in Mexico at subnational level based on the case of Veracruz. By decomposing the process of interaction between the movement and the counter-movement in Veracruz between 2006 and 2010, two mechanisms of movement response were identified: learning and adaptation of repertoires. This analytical decomposition reveals that response mechanisms characterized by the LGBT movement’s learning and adaptation of repertoires addressed the sustained veto of conservative groups at state level, as well as increased persecution, violence, and stigmatization. As a result, the LGBT movement scaled up its strategies from the subnational to the national level by 1) seeking greater coordination (creation of The State Coalition) and alliances with national networks and platforms (such as the national platform of hate crimes and expert associations on sexual rights); 2) creating spaces for demands with national public agencies (with lawsuits before Conapred) and interlocution and dialogue with political leaders who sought support from national leaderships (the case of Morena and the unsuccessful support of the Ministry of the Interior); 3) proposing a litigation strategy that escalated from the filing of amparo actions to the judicialization of the demands for same-sex marriage, through unconstitutionality lawsuits before the SCJN supported by the CNDH.
The case of Veracruz provides several lessons to problematize different experiences at subnational level. Despite the diversity and internal state heterogeneity, conservative activism, with strong roots in areas such as Cordoba, Orizaba, and Coatzacoalcos, has a clear projection throughout the state and a presence both in the media and in political advocacy. Faced with this, the LGBT mobilization has met the challenge of also trying to coordinate its actions statewide. Although the efforts for articulation through the State Coalition were novel, the actors that manage to link with other national organizations are very specific due to the limited capacity to mobilize resources or connections, which is a great challenge for subnational collective action when trying to consolidate agendas that increase pressure nationally. This is also evident with the National Observatory of Hate Crimes, which has remained in the hands of a few collectives, fragmenting the action. Despite these limitations, it is clear that the national connection is important, since the demands are surpassed at subnational level, hence the legal strategies are intended precisely to project the demands from the subnational to the national level, given the high capacity of institutional advocacy and veto imposed by the state’s conservative groups.
The results of the research show that the relationship between movement and counter-movement, in the context of conflicts over sexual and reproductive rights in Mexico, takes on particular nuances subnationally. While LGBT rights have advanced significantly in Mexico City and in some states of the republic, in other subnational contexts, there prevail situations of low recognition and an important presence of conservative activism that vetoes and blocks such rights. Given the relevant presence of Catholic hierarchies, the growing mobilization of civil organizations calling themselves “pro-life” and “pro-family,” and the agency of politicians who yield and make alliances with these conservative actors, advancing LGBT rights is bound by great challenges. However, the research shows that the effects on the practices and strategies of the LGBT movement through learning and adaptation of repertoires cannot necessarily be categorized as negative, insofar as they have been constituted as opportunities to redefine political and discursive strategies of incidence from the subnational to the national. This shows that the movement-countermovement relationship is always dynamic and transforms the very logic of collective action.