El teorema de ingreso equivalente para subastas de un objeto: aproximación experimental
No. 17 (2003-01-01)Author(s)
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Fernando Beltrán*Profesor Asociado Departamento Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de los Andes, hbeltran@uniandes.edu.co.
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Natalia Santamaría**Magister en Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de los Andes, n-santam@uniandes.edu.co.
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Camilo Restrepo***Magister en Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de los Andes, am-rest@uniandes.edu.co.
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Pamela Cardoso****Magister en Ingeniería Industrial, Universidad de los Andes, p-cardos@uniandes.edu.co.
Abstract
Auctions are price setting mechanisms that reduce transaction costs. In addition, auctions are efficient mechanisms because the winner will have the object to its best use. This paper presents the results of extensive simulated experimentation to observe and test the results given by the Revenue Equivalence Theorem. The Theorem says that all members of a certain family of auctions with some defined properties yield the same expected revenue to the seller. The auctions studied are Sad Losers, Santa Claus, All Pay, and Last Pay; these auctions satisfy the assumptions needed for the results of the Theorem to be valid.
Keywords:
Pricing mechanisms, auctions, Revenue Equivalence Theorem, auctions experiments