Integración vertical en el sector colombiano de la salud
No. 77 (2016-07-01)Autor/a(es/as)
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David Bardey1Profesor asociado de la Facultad de Economía de la Universidad de los Andes y profesor visitante en la Escuela de Economía de Toulouse. Correo electrónico: d.bardey@uniandes.edu.co.
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Giancarlo Buitrago2Estudiante de Doctorado en Economía de la Universidad de los Andes. Profesor del Departamento de Epidemiología Clínica y Bioestadística de la Pontificia Universidad Javeriana. Correo electrónico: g_buitrago@javeriana.edu.co.
Resumen
Este artículo presenta una revisión de la literatura relacionada con la integración vertical en sistemas de salud, con un énfasis especial en el sector colombiano de la salud. Empezamos introduciendo algunos conceptos generales acerca de la integración vertical, y presentamos algunas de sus ventajas y desventajas tradicionales. Luego, nos enfocamos en las consecuencias de la integración vertical en el sector de la salud, tomando como referencia la experiencia de Estados Unidos. A continuación, describimos el sistema de salud colombiano y algunos cambios de la regulación de la integración vertical. Finalmente, proveemos algunas recomendaciones de política pública relacionada con esta regulación. En particular, recomendamos un cambio desde un enfoque regulatorio hacia un modelo de supervisión.
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