Diferenciación ideológica y coordinación estratégica en elecciones presidenciales en América Latina
No. 103 (2020-07-01)Autor/a(es/as)
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Diego LujánUniversidad de la República (Uruguay)
Resumen
Objetivo/contexto: este artículo estima el efecto de la diferenciación ideológica sobre el nivel de coordinación electoral en elecciones presidenciales en América Latina. La fragmentación de los sistemas de partidos depende en buena medida del nivel de coordinación electoral, la cual es afectada, de acuerdo con la literatura, por las reglas electorales y la heterogeneidad social. El artículo sostiene que es necesario considerar el impacto de factores políticos, como la diferenciación ideológica, sobre la coordinación electoral. Se argumenta que la diferenciación ideológica, en tanto atributo de la competencia programática, aumenta la capacidad de las élites políticas y de los votantes para coordinar sus decisiones de entrada y de voto, respectivamente. Metodología: mediante modelos estadísticos, se muestra que aquellos sistemas que exhiben una mayor diferenciación ideológica, medida como polarización ponderada entre los agentes del sistema, presentan niveles más altos de coordinación electoral, lo que redunda en una menor fragmentación absoluta y efectiva, una mayor concentración del voto en los candidatos más fuertes y un menor nivel de votos desperdiciados. Conclusiones: la diferenciación ideológica entre los partidos en competencia afecta significativamente los niveles de coordinación electoral, y este efecto es estable y robusto a controles institucionales y socioestructurales. Los sistemas de partidos programáticamente estructurados, y por tanto ideológicamente diferenciados, presentan mayor nivel de coordinación electoral que aquellos estructurados sobre apelaciones no programáticas (clientelares, personalistas). Originalidad: la fragmentación ha sido abordada principalmente como el producto de los sistemas electorales y de la heterogeneidad social, o como una combinación de ambos. Sin embargo, este artículo muestra que, dado que la fragmentación depende de la capacidad de élites y votantes para coordinar sus decisiones de entrada y voto, esta también es afectada por factores estrictamente políticos, como el grado de diferenciación ideológica existente.
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Licencia
Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0.