Congressistas no tribunal: uma análise do uso da ação de inconstitucionalidade por membros do Congresso na Colômbia 1992-2015
No. 96 (2018-10-01)Autor(es)
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Santiago Virgüez RuizUniversidad de los Andes (Colombia)
Resumo
A relação entre o ramo legislativo e o judicial nas democracias constitucionais tem sido objeto de diversos debates acadêmicos. Contudo, essa literatura pouco trata do papel que os congressistas cumprem como sujeitos ativos em cenários judiciais, em especial quando demandam leis promulgadas durante seu período no cargo. Este artigo procura abordar a pergunta de por que alguns congressistas colombianos utilizam o mecanismo de controle constitucional para anular normas de cuja criação participaram. A partir de informação de caráter quantitativo e qualitativo, explica-se como o uso das demandas de constitucionalidade por parte dos congressistas não se limita a uma estratégia de oposição por parte dos partidos independentes ou de oposição, mas sim servem aos membros da coalização de governo para diferentes propósitos, como: i) afastar-se da linha política do Executivo quando não se está de acordo com os conteúdos normativos ou quando a reforma afeta os interesses de seu eleitorado; ii) para “limpar” iniciativas do Executivo das modificações feitas por forças da oposição durante o trâmite legislativo e iii) para dar sequência a certos pontos de sua agenda e evitar o custo político de opor-se durante o processo legislativo.
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