Colombia Internacional

Colomb. int. | eISSN 1900-6004 | ISSN 0121-5612

Por que os rebeldes deixam de lutar? Declive organizacional e deserção na insurgência da Colômbia

No. 110 (2022-04-01)
  • Enzo Nussio
    Centro de Estudios de Seguridad, ETH Zurich (Suiza)
  • Juan E. Ugarriza
    Universidad del Rosario (Colombia)

Resumo

Objetivo/contexto: a deserção — ou a saída não autorizada de um grupo armado — tem grandes implicações para a contrainsurgência, a cessação da guerra e a dinâmica de recrutamento. Enquanto a pesquisa existente ressalta a importância das motivações individuais para a deserção, o declínio organizacional — sob a forma de adversidades militares e financeiras — também pode condicionar a deserção. O declínio organizacional prejudica os instrumentos de um grupo para canalizar preferências individuais em ações coletivas. Esses instrumentos incluem incentivos seletivos, apelo ideológico e coerção. Quando o poder de vinculação desses instrumentos diminui, os desejos individuais começam a dominar o comportamento, tornando a deserção mais provável. Metodologia: a insurgência das Forças Armadas Revolucionárias da Colômbia (Farc) é usada para examinar este argumento com uma abordagem multimetodológica. Em primeiro lugar, uma análise quantitativa emprega dados únicos sobre mais de 19.000 desertores das Farc relatados de 2002 a 2017, segundo dados do Ministério da Defesa colombiano. Protegendo-se contra ameaças à inferência causal, a análise estatística indica que o declínio organizacional leva à deserção. Em segundo lugar, uma análise qualitativa utiliza um grande conjunto de relatórios detalhados sobre entrevistas com desertores conduzidas por militares colombianos. Conclusões: os relatórios demonstram que o declínio organizacional enfraquece os incentivos seletivos, a ideologia do grupo e um regime coercitivo confiável, e promove a deserção por meio desses mecanismos. Originalidade: essas descobertas fornecem insights fundamentais para os formuladores de políticas, uma vez que a deserção pode tanto contribuir para acabar com o conflito quanto acelerar o recrutamento de novos combatentes.

Palavras-chave: Colômbia, declínio organizacional, deserção, FARC, ideología, incentivos seletivos, coerção

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