Implementation in the Allocation of Projects with the Royalties in Colombia: A Theoretical Approach
No. 78 (2017-03-01)Author(s)
-
Daniel Blandón Restrepo
Abstract
This paper studies the implementation of majority voting in OCADs (Collegiate Administration and Decision Bodies) to choose which projects will be financed with royalties in Colombia. The results show that votes made in OCADs are not implementable unless some assumptions about leaders’ preferences and the voting mechanism are added. Implementation is achieved assuming that the central government is always honest about its preferences; that departmental and municipal governments have unimodal preferences (such as when leaders show preferences for projects based on the proximity of these to their own regions); and that the first stage of voting (which is when mayors who will represent their municipal governments in the OCADs are elected) is carried out to vote for projects and not for mayors.
References
Arrow, K. (1951). Social choice and individual values. Nueva York: John Wiley.
Black, D. (1948). On the rationale of group decision-making. Journal of Political Economy, 56(1), 23-34.
Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. Nueva York: Harper Collins.
Easley, D., & Kleinberg, J. (2010). Networks, crowds and markets: Reasoning about a highly connected world. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gaertner, W. A. (2009). A Primer in social choice theory. Oxford: Editorial Wiley Finance, Oxford University Press.
Gibbard, A. (1973). Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica, 41(4), 587-601.
Mas-Collel, A.., Whinston, M., & Green, J. (1995). Microeconomic theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Maskin, E., Laffont, J., & Hildebrand, W. (1982). The theory of incentives: An overview. Cambridge University Press.
Maskin, E. (1999). Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality. Review of Economics Studies, 66(1), 23-38.
Nehring, K., & Puppe, C. (2002). Strategy-proof social choice on singlepeaked domains. Possibility, impossibility and the space between. Davis: Department of Economy, University of California at Davis.
Satterthwaite, M. (1975). Strategy-proofness and arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic Theory, 10(2), 187-217.
Serrano, R. (2003). The theory of implementation of social choices rules. Providence: Brown University.
Sistema General de Regalías. (2012). Cartilla virtual Ley 1530 de 2012. Bogotá. República de Colombia: Departamento Nacional de Planeación.
Taylor, A., & Pacelli, A. (2008). Mathematics and politics. Nueva York: Editorial Springer.