Resumen
Los académicos han mostrado que las constituciones escritas pueden ser reformadas de manera informal con efectos similares a los que tendría una reforma formal. Pese a ello, los diversos métodos de reforma informal aún no están bien organizados para poder analizarlos y compararlos. En este artículo examino las formas de la reforma informal, las clasifico como convencionales y no convencionales y propongo un tipo de reforma informal que aún no ha sido apreciado ni teorizado: el desuso constitucional. La desuetud constitucional ocurre cuando una regla constitucional escrita pierde sus cualidades vinculantes sobre los actuales actores políticos como resultado de su desuso consciente y constante y del repudio público por parte de los actores políticos que los precedieron. El desuso constitucional se asemeja –pero a la vez se diferencia– de las demás formas de reforma informal: es similar porque cambia los significados de las disposiciones constitucionales sin alterar el texto constitucional, pero es diferente en el entendido de que conduce a que la Constitución pierda validez política pese a que se mantiene intacto el texto. En este estudio utilizo el ejemplo de la Constitución de Canadá para ilustrar el fenómeno del desuso constitucional.
Citas
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