Exploración de la terminación de organizaciones en Colombia: comprender el impacto de los factores políticos y económicos en la supervivencia de las organizaciones públicas
No. 112 (2022-10-01)Autor/a(es/as)
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Luis Bernardo Mejía GuinandUniversidad de los Andes (Colombia)
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Isabella Pinzón CaputoUniversidad de los Andes (Colombia)
Resumen
Objetivo/contexto: este artículo analiza los factores que se relacionan con los incentivos para que las organizaciones públicas dejen de operar. El documento sugiere que la rotación política tiene un efecto negativo en la duración de este tipo de entidades. Sin embargo, este efecto difiere según el tamaño de la coalición gobernante. Metodología: se utilizan modelos semiparamétricos y regresiones de Cox para estimar la supervivencia de 415 organizaciones públicas en Colombia. Conclusiones: los datos muestran que un cambio en la administración presidencial permite al nuevo presidente remodelar la administración de acuerdo con sus intereses. El análisis de los datos también indica que cuanto mayor sea el tamaño de la coalición de gobierno, menor será la probabilidad de que una entidad pública sea eliminada. Originalidad: utilizamos una base de datos original que contiene información longitudinal sobre las organizaciones públicas en Colombia para el periodo 1958 a 2020. La base de datos contiene 415 observaciones sobre las características organizacionales de cada entidad. Este artículo contribuye a la escasa literatura sobre terminación de organizaciones públicas en América Latina.
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Esta obra está bajo una licencia internacional Creative Commons Atribución-NoComercial-SinDerivadas 4.0.