Survivals and Aversions of Colombian Revolutionaries. Strategic Preferences of Guerrilla Groups Faced with the Possibility of Negotiating Peace

Why did certain Colombian armed groups such as the M-19, the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), the Workers’ Revolutionary Party (PRT) and the Socialist Renovation Current (CRS) decide to sign a peace agreement while others, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) refused to do so? Based on a historical analysis of the political behavior of these armed groups, this essay shows that willingness to negotiate depends, at least partly, on the belligerents’ extremism or moderation, which varies as a function of the balance of power between ‘hardliners’ and ‘softliners’ (distribution of political, economic, and strategic resources) within each collective actor. The essay identifies four strategic choices: recognition of the adversary, acceptance of negotiation as a valid political tool for conflict resolution, calls for defining the rules of peace negotiations, and sending costly signals in favor of peace, which help to distinguish a moderate from an extremist. The essay concludes that the use of political violence is not necessarily an indicator of extremism.