Partisan Powers and Ministerial Recruitment. The Argentine Case
No. 120 (2024-10-09)Author(s)
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Marcelo CamerloInstituto de Ciencias Sociales de la Universidad de Lisboa (Portugal)
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Paula ClericiUniversidad Torcuato Di Tella - Conicet (Argentina)
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Anabella MolinaUniversidad de Buenos Aires - Conicet (Argentina)
Abstract
Objective/context: Party recruitment is a crucial governance tool in contemporary democracies. Presidential and parliamentary heads of government distribute ministerial portfolios to party members in exchange for essential political resources, such as legislative support. This article explores the relationship between government formation and political parties, with parties that are not very institutionalized. In particular, it examines the extent to which arguments about presidential cabinet formation hold up when the hierarchical level of party ministers is considered. Methodology: This statistical study uses a generalized linear model (GLM) with a binomial distribution and a logit link function with robust standard errors. It aims to carry out causality exploration to test the original indicators of the proposed dependent variables. Conclusions: Hierarchy and partisan powers are relevant factors to complement existing explanations of ministerial recruitment strategies. Originality: Comparative research on government formation and its connection to political parties has made significant progress, focusing on the distinction between ministers affiliated and not affiliated with a party. However, this dichotomous approach neglects consideration of the hierarchical position within the party structure, a fundamental aspect of the governing party model underlying parliamentary democracies. This article presents a trichotomous measure that considers the hierarchical level of ministers.
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