Supreme Courts and Democracy in Argentina: a theoretical proposal
No. 4 (2020-01-01)Author(s)
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Augusto AbdulhadiUniversidad Nacional de San Martín -UNSAM-, Argentina
Abstract
The literature of comparative judicial politics worked extensively on the political factors that explain judicial turnover in Supreme Courts, both at the national and subnational levels of government. The most recent contributions of this literature, particularly on the provincial level in Argentina, maintain that governors are who decide when Supreme Courts judges retire, and also, that party factions are key to explain judicial turnover at Supreme Courts, both in provinces of hegemonic party as in multiparty provinces. However, successive works in this literature pointed out that there is no clear relationship between legislative majorities and judicial turnover at Supreme Courts. This paper proposes different causal mechanisms to explain political changes of judges of the Supreme Courts in diverse political contexts, building from the analysis of the Argentine provinces of Chaco, Misiones and Santa Fe between 1983 and 2011.
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