Revista de Estudios Sociales

rev. estud. soc. | eISSN 1900-5180 | ISSN 0123-885X

Perdón y dejar ir: formas de cambiar el entorno normativo

No. 86 (2023-10-26)
  • Dana Kay Nelkin
    University of California, San Diego, Estados Unidos

Resumen

Con frecuencia, el perdón se distingue de otras formas de eliminar (o disminuir) la culpa, por ejemplo, el dejar ir. En este artículo me centro en una concepción del perdón como un cambio en el entorno normativo (la alteración de los derechos  y de las obligaciones de las partes involucradas), y exploro la distinción entre el perdón —entendido de esta manera— y el dejar ir. Destaco el poder explicativo de este enfoque para distinguir el perdón y el dejar ir, y lo contrasto con una forma alternativa en la que el foco se centra, principalmente, en un tipo de cambio de actitud. Concluyo comparando las implicaciones que tienen el perdón y el dejar ir en otros fenómenos importantes, como la reconciliación. 

Palabras clave: culpa, dejar ir, entorno normativo, perdón, responsabilidad

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