Revista de Estudios Sociales

rev. estud. soc. | eISSN 1900-5180 | ISSN 0123-885X

Perdão e deixar ir: maneiras de mudar o ambiente normativo

No. 86 (2023-10-26)
  • Dana Kay Nelkin
    University of California, San Diego, United States
https://doi.org/10.7440/res86.2023.03

Resumo

O perdão é muitas vezes diferenciado de outras formas de remoção (ou diminuição) da culpa, como, por exemplo, o deixar ir Neste artigo, concentro-me em uma concepção do perdão como uma mudança no ambiente normativo (a alteração dos direitos e obrigações das partes envolvidas) e exploro a distinção entre o perdão — entendido dessa forma — e o deixar ir. Destaco o poder explicativo dessa abordagem para diferenciar o perdão e o deixar ir, e a contrasto com uma forma alternativa em que o foco está principalmente em um tipo de mudança de atitude. Concluo comparando as consequências do perdão e do deixar ir para outros fenômenos importantes, como a reconciliação.

Palavras-chave: ambiente normativo, culpa, deixar ir, perdão, responsabilidade

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