Bringing the Structure Back in: Limited Access Orders, “Extreme” ISI and Development
No. 68 (2019-04-01)Author(s)
-
Mona LyneUniversity of Missouri-Kansas City (Estados Unidos)
Abstract
Structuralists highlighted politico-economic constraints on late development and advocated infant industry policies. In practice, highly distortionary implementation choices were near ubiquitous. Why did policymakers prefer this extreme policy? Employing North, Wallis & Weingast (2009), I argue politicians were constrained by a limited access order (LAO) to directly distribute production rights to powerful groups. “Extreme” ISI policies maximized politicians’ ability to directly distribute production rights; a milder policy meant replacing state-conferred rights with market mechanisms. I review representative “extreme” policies in Brazil, Chile and India, and then demonstrate their political efficacy in diversifying production rights that could be directly exchanged for elite support. Finally, I discuss the argument’s consistency with early structuralist emphasis on underlying politico-economic conditions as impediments to growth.
References
Baer, Werner & Michel E. A.Herve.1966. “Employment and Industrialization in Developing Countries.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 80: 88-107.
Behrman, Jere.1976. Chile. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bergsman, Joel.1970. Brazil: Industrialization and Trade Policies. London: Oxford University Press.
Bhagwati, Jagdish.1978. Anatomy and Consequences of Exchange Control Regimes. Cambridge: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Bhagwati, Jagdish & T. N.Srinivasan.1975. India. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research.
Balassa, Bela A.1982. Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Countries. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Haber, Stephen, ed.2002. Crony Capitalism and Economic Growth in Latin America: Theory and Evidence.Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
Haggard, Stephan.1990. Pathways from the Periphery: The Politics of Growth in the Newly Industrializing Countries. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Huber, Evelyne.2002. Models of Capitalism. Lessons for Latin America. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Huddle, Donald.1967. “Furtado on Exchange Control and Economic Development: An Evaluation and Reinterpretation of the Brazilian Case.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 15: 269-285.
Krueger, Anne O.1974. “The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society.” American Economic Review 64: 291-303.
Little, I. M. D., TiborScitovsky & MauriceScott.1970. Industry and Trade in Some Developing Countries: A Comparative Study. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lyne, Mona.2015. “Rethinking the Political Economy of Import Substitution Industrialization in Brazil: A Clientelist Model of Development Policymaking.” Latin American Politics and Society 57(1): 75-98.
Lyne, Mona.2017. “How Crony Capitalists Cannibalize National Development: The Political Economy of Rent-provision Differentiating Mechanisms of Exchange.” Paper presented at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago.
Macario, Santiago.1964. “Protectionism and Industrialization in Latin America.” Economic Bulletin for Latin America IX (1): 61-102.
North, Douglass C. & Barry R.Weingast.1989. “Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England.” The Journal of Economic History XLIX (4): 803-832.
NorthDouglass C., John J.Wallis & Barry R.Weingast.2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Prebisch, Raul.1963. Towards a Dynamic Development Policy for Latin America. New York: United Nations.
Prebisch, Raul.1985. “Five Stages in My Thinking.” In Pioneers in Development, edited by Gerald M.Meier & DudleySeers, 175-191. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Von Doellinger, Carlos, Leonardo C.Cavalcanti & Flávio CasteloBranco.1977. Política e estrutura das importações brasileiras. Rio de Janeiro: IPEA/INPES.
Wade, Robert.1990. Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License.